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Abstract Socialization and individual differences were
examined as antecedents of moral motivation in represen-
tative samples of 15-year-old adolescents (N = 1,258; 54%
female) and 21-year-old young adults (N = 584; 53%
female). The adolescents’ primary caregivers (N = 1,056)
also participated. The strength of moral motivation was
rated by participants’ responses to two hypothetical moral
dilemmas in terms of action decisions, emotion attribu-
tions, and justifications. Socialization was measured by the
perceived quality of friendship, parent–child relationships,
and educational background. The importance attached to
social justice and various personality traits were also
assessed. Adolescents’ moral motivation was positively
associated with the quality of their parent–child relation-
ship and the importance of social justice. Young adults’
moral motivation was predicted by the perceived quality of
friendships, the importance of social justice, and agree-
ableness. For both groups, moral motivation was greater in
females. The theoretical implications of the findings for the
development of moral motivation are discussed.
Keywords Moral motivation  Socialization 
Moral values  Personality characteristics
Introduction
As Western societies become more and more diversified
both demographically and politically, the question of why
individuals are motivated to act morally becomes notably
more important. In moral psychology, moral motivation
has been defined as individuals’ readiness to abide by a
moral rule they understand to be valid, even when this rule
is in conflict with nonmoral desires (Nunner-Winkler
1999). This definition implies that moral motivation has a
strong cognitive component, as the person must understand
the validity of moral rules. However, the person must also
reflect upon this moral knowledge and choose to accept it
as personally binding (Blasi 2004). This process results in
responsibility judgments that reflect the person’s
moral motivation (Krettenauer et al. 2008). To date, many
questions regarding the antecedents of an individual’s
motivation to act morally remain unanswered.
Recently, theorists have emphasized the need to inves-
tigate moral motivation in its own right, as well as its
socialization and individual antecedents (Carlo and Pope
Edwards 2005; Nunner-Winkler et al. 2007). Strikingly,
there has been little empirical research on these topics to
date. Our study attempts to close some of these gaps by
investigating these antecedents of moral motivation. This
objective is important, because its achievement would
provide further insight into why individuals develop the
motivation to act morally. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to use comparable measures to analyze
moral motivation during two different periods of life: mid-
adolescence and young adulthood. Such a comparison can
provide useful information on the developmentally differ-
entiated roles of socialization and individual antecedents of
moral motivation. In contrast to the few previous studies on
moral motivation, our study utilizes large, representative
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samples. This approach has the advantage that individuals
from all socioeconomic strata are adequately represented.
Socialization Antecedents of Moral Motivation
This study investigates the perceived quality of relationships
with significant others (friends and parents) as socialization
antecedents of moral motivation. We have chosen to focus
on these relationships because their role in moral develop-
ment is theoretically unchallenged. From a social-
constructivist perspective, it is through individuals’ con-
structive social interactions involving negotiation and the
provision of support that their cognitive moral development
is transformed (Piaget 1977/1995). Moral norms, such as
justice and fairness, are not simply imposed by society; they
are (re-)invented in the context of cooperative, supportive
relationships (Mu¨ller and Carpendale 2000, p. 144). It is thus
reasonable to assume that the quality of significant rela-
tionships strongly influences moral motivation.
From a co-constructivist perspective, egalitarian rela-
tionships with friends foster moral development (Youniss
1980) because they create opportunities for social perspec-
tive-taking and discursive exchanges (Keller 1996).
Through the reciprocal experiences of responsibility and
support, emotional ties to close friends may help develop the
motivation to act fairly (Keller and Edelstein 1993; Selman
1980). Particularly in adolescence, the quality of close
friendships is likely to provide an experiential background
for the growth of moral motivation. This is because the
emergence of identity and the related motivational orienta-
tion toward fairness and care strongly depend on supportive
and close relationships during this developmental period
(Erikson 1959). There has been little research on the role of
the quality of friendships in the development of moral
motivation. What research there has been suggests that
friendship quality has a positive effect on moral reasoning.
For example, Walker et al. (2000) found that in interactions
among friends, the elicitation of the other’s opinion and
checks for understanding promoted the development of
moral reasoning in late childhood and mid-adolescence (see
also Schonert-Reichl 1999). The strength of moral motiva-
tion depends in part on the complexity of one’s moral
reasoning ability (Krettenauer and Edelstein 1999), because
moral motivation requires knowledge of rules as well as
reflection on this knowledge. This interconnectedness sug-
gests that moral motivation is likely to be related to the
quality of one’s relationships with friends.
Theorists in the cognitive-structural and social domain
traditions have assumed that a sense of personal responsi-
bility is rooted in the formation of close relationships to
significant others, such as parents (Kohlberg and Diessner
1991; Smetana 1997). For this study, we conceptualized
good parent–child relationships as supportive and
characterized by high levels of trust and warmth. Van
Ijzendoorn (1997) has argued that supportive parents foster
emotional autonomy by providing an atmosphere of trust
and openness, thereby helping children and adolescents to
develop role-taking abilities. This process may later pro-
mote trust in one’s own moral judgments and foster
principled moral reasoning (Arsenio and Gold 2006). This
line of argument is supported by research predicated on the
assumption that indicators of supportive parenting, such as
warmth, are positively associated with the development of
moral reasoning (e.g., Pratt et al. 2004). Nunner-Winkler
(2007), however, found no relation between the quality of
parent–child relationships in middle childhood and moral
motivation in adolescence and young adulthood. Thus, the
quality of the parent–child relationship earlier on is not
necessarily important for the subsequent emergence of
moral motivation. Nevertheless, Malti et al. (2008) found
that supportive parenting was positively related to the
attribution of moral emotions to 6- and 7-year-olds. Sup-
portive parenting, a commonly used indicator of the
strength of moral motivation, is measured by asking how
frequently a child attributes negative emotions to a hypo-
thetical wrongdoer after the wrongdoer has violated a rule.
Although it remains unclear at this point whether the per-
ceived quality of the parent–child relationship is associated
cross-sectionally with moral motivation, such a relation-
ship is suggested by the conceptual overlap between moral
motivation and moral reasoning.
We were also interested in the role of education in moral
motivation. Educational attainment is part of the socio-
economic milieu in which adolescents grow up. This milieu
is reflected in a specific set of rituals that provides both
opportunities and implicit philosophies for the develop-
ment of (moral) competencies in youth (Lareau 2004).
Researchers have stressed that social-class factors, of
which education is an example, are important in moral
development (Edelstein et al. 1990). Nunner-Winkler et al.
(2006) were the first to investigate the relationship between
education and moral motivation. Their study revealed that
level of education is positively related to moral motivation
in German adolescents. In the present study, we followed
up on this finding by investigating the relationship between
education and moral motivation in representative samples
of adolescents and young adults in Switzerland.
Individual Antecedents of Moral Motivation
For this study, we chose to examine personal values and
personality characteristics as the individual antecedents of
the strength of moral motivation. This choice was based on
the fact that moral values and personality have only
recently been considered in the empirical research in the
field, even though they are important for a comprehensive
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understanding of moral development (Hardy and Carlo
2005; Walker 2004). Personal values have been defined as
‘‘enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct is per-
sonally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse
mode of conduct or end-state of existence’’ (Rokeach 1973,
p. 5). These values give meaning to, and are linked to,
behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Moral exemplars, that
is, people with an extraordinarily high commitment to
morality, strongly endorse moral values such as justice and
social responsibility. In fact, such values are a major
component of their identity (Hart and Fegley 1995). Blasi
(2004) has stressed that the salience of moral values is an
important component of morality.
People who place a high value on the norms of fairness
and justice are likely to emphasize, and act in conformance
with, their moral judgments in many situations. They do so
because it helps them remain self-consistent. This conclu-
sion has been supported empirically. For example, Walker
(2004) has shown that ordinary people describe moral
exemplars as ‘‘principled-idealistic,’’ a label that highlights
the importance that the attributor assigns to strongly held
moral values (see Bergman 2004). In this study, we ana-
lyzed the relationship between the importance of social
justice and the degree of moral motivation. The importance
of social justice was selected because it refers to the wel-
fare of all humanity and thus reflects a core moral concern.
Nunner-Winkler et al. (2006) have provided the first evi-
dence that adolescents with strong moral motivation are
more orientated toward equality and providing care for
people in need than are adolescents with low moral moti-
vation. We followed up on this finding by examining
whether moral motivation is enhanced when individuals
attach a high degree of importance to social justice.
Further, we investigated the relationship between per-
sonality characteristics and moral motivation. Nucci (2004)
has pointed out that Blasi’s (2004) concept of integrating
morality into one’s personal identity does not necessarily
refer to a specific set of noncognitive personality charac-
teristics. On the contrary, we agree with (Haan 1977) that
personality characteristics imply dynamic, integrative sys-
tems of self-organization and of social-cognitive and
socioemotional functioning. These systems also include
intellectual ability, as they involve the capacity to engage
in practical, flexible, and context-sensitive reasoning (Prinz
2009). Thus, we do not conceptualize personality charac-
teristics as a nonreflexive set of externally acquired traits,
but rather as a complex, internal set of identity-related
aspects that are continuously (re)constructed during the
course of development. As such, they may be relevant to
moral functioning, because they affect how a person
interacts with others in a majority of social situations.
These social interactions, in turn, may help people to
reinvent their choices in situations calling for moral action.
Resilient ego functioning, such as emotional stability,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and a sense of responsi-
bility, may therefore relate to an individual’s strength of
moral motivation. On the other hand, defence mechanisms,
such as neuroticism, may hinder it (see Matsuba and
Walker 1998). Research has supported a relationship
between ego functioning (or, if one prefers, personality
characteristics) and moral development. In a longitudinal
study, Hart et al. (1998) found that ego-resiliency predicted
the development of moral reasoning in adolescent. Simi-
larly, Atkins et al. (2005) found that children classified as
resilient were more likely than children characterized as
overcontrolled or undercontrolled to participate in volun-
teer work when they became adolescents. In these studies,
resilience was defined as emotional stability and the ability
to modify one’s impulses when confronted with situational
demands. In a study by Walker (1999), adults described
moral exemplars as high on conscientiousness and agree-
ableness. A study by Carlo et al. (2005) indicated that
agreeableness is related to volunteerism. Taken together,
these studies provide evidence for the role of personality
characteristics that reflect resilient ego functioning (i.e.,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability)
in the development of morality.
Finally, our study is the first to compare moral moti-
vation in mid-adolescents and young adults. Adolescence is
the stage of life when the moral self and the related moral
motivation are established (Blasi 2004), as well as a stable
identity. From a developmental perspective, then, one may
expect to find an increase in moral motivation when ado-
lescents enter adulthood, because that is when they learn to
accept that obligations are binding. They also begin to
integrate the norms of fairness and care into their self-
concepts, both personally and morally. So far, however,
these plausible hypotheses about the development of moral
motivation have not been confirmed empirically.
Hypotheses
We chose to investigate the role of socialization factors (i.e.,
quality of close friendships, the parent–child relationship,
educational attainment) and individual factors (i.e., the
value placed on social justice and personality characteris-
tics) in the development of moral motivation in adolescents
and young adults. Based on the results of research examining
the association between relationship quality and moral rea-
soning, we hypothesized that the quality of friendships and
the quality of the parent–child relationship are positively
related to moral motivation. We also expected that rela-
tionship quality is more strongly related to moral motivation
in adolescence than in young adulthood, because identity
development and the associated motivations depend
strongly on the development of relationships with significant
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others during adolescence (Erikson 1959). Based on the
previous study by Nunner-Winkler et al. (2006), we
hypothesized that education level is positively associated
moral motivation. As for individual differences, we
hypothesized that the value one places social justice, as well
as the personal characteristics of agreeableness, conscien-
tiousness, and emotional stability, are positively related to
moral motivation. Finally, because of the increasing con-
nection between personal identity and moral development
over time, we expected moral motivation to be higher in
young adults than adolescents.
We controlled for basic structural indicators of the
socio-economic milieu and migration background of the
participants as well as cognitive ability, because research
has shown that these variables are related to moral devel-
opment (Edelstein et al. 1990). We also controlled for sex,
as Nunner-Winkler et al. (2007) found that females display
higher moral motivation than males.
Method
The data were taken from the first wave of a representative
longitudinal survey of children and adolescents living in
Switzerland (Buchmann et al. 2007). Specifically, we
investigated the life course and the development of com-
petence in three age groups (6 years-old, 15 years-old, and
21 years-old). The present analysis is based on the data
from the 15- and 21-year-olds, who were surveyed in
spring 2006. A representative random sample was drawn
from the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzer-
land. There were 131 communities selected, broken down
by size and type. The group members residing in the
selected communities were then randomly sampled on the
basis of information provided by the official register of
residents. The final response rates were 63% for the 15-
year-olds and 50% for the 21-year-olds. For statistical
analysis, the samples were weighted to correct for nonre-
sponse, as well as for an overrepresentation of some
community types and a moderate underrepresentation of
lower educational strata, nationalities, and community
types.
Participants
The final sample consisted of 1,258 adolescents with an
average age of 15.30 years (SD = 0.21; 54% girls), and
584 young adults with an average age of 21.30 years
(SD = 0.20, 53% girls). Furthermore, 1,056 primary
caregivers, predominantly mothers (89%), were linked to
the adolescent sample.
Among the 15-year-old adolescents, 80% were Swiss,
18% were of other European nationalities, and 2% were
non-European. Of the parents, 32% had secondary educa-
tion or less, 44% had vocational training or college, 15%
had a higher vocational diploma, and 9% had a university
degree. As for family composition, 82% of the adolescents
were living with both parents, and the average number of
siblings was 1.70 (SD = 1.12).
Among the 21-year-old adults, 79% were Swiss, 17% were
of other European nationalities, and 4% were non-European.
Of the parents, 38% had secondary education or less, 43% had
vocational training or college, 11% had a higher vocational
diploma, and 8% had a university degree. As for family
composition, 84% of the primary caregivers were married and
the average number of siblings was 1.88 (SD = 1.26).
Procedure
Written informed consent for testing was obtained from the
participant and (for the 15-year-olds) from the primary
caregiver. All participants were given a computer-assisted
personal interview (CAPI) in a quiet room at their home.
The interview lasted about 60 min and contained questions
on the participant’s social development, as well as on the
most important socialization conditions. Forty-two inter-
viewers conducted the interviews of the 15-year-olds, and
40 interviewers conducted the interviews of the 21-year-
olds. The interviewers were recruited from a professional
research institute specializing in social-science interviews
and had been trained by the research team in the interview
techniques. The primary caregivers were given a ques-
tionnaire on adolescent social development, which they
filled out and mailed back to the research institute.
Measures
All the measures were translated from German into French
by bilingual French and German speakers, retranslated and
modified by the research team if necessary. A pilot study
with 236 15-year-old adolescents was conducted to test the
validity of the vignettes on moral development and other
measures concerning adolescent development. The final
measures were developed on the basis of results from a
pilot study.
Moral Motivation
Strength of moral motivation was assessed by a previously
validated measure consisting of hypothetical moral
dilemmas. They included action decisions, attributions of
emotion, and justifications for both (Nunner-Winkler et al.
2006, 2007). Two dilemmas of medium gravity involving
the temptation to transgress well-known moral rules for
personal benefit were chosen, based on the following cri-
teria: first, the structure of the conflict had to be familiar to
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the participants. Second, the story had to involve clear
moral issues. Third, the immoral action decision had to be
easily justified, and the participant could refer to the nor-
mality of the transgression (e.g., maximizing personal
profit is common in the business world; Nunner-Winkler
et al. 2007, p. 33). Finally, the characters and events in the
stories had to be ones that both sexes could identify with
equally and that do not evoke gender stereotypes. For
example, neither story involved the conflict between a
prosocial moral duty and the accumulation of power. The
characters in the story were always of the same sex as the
participant, and the order of the stories was counterbal-
anced to avoid order effects.
In the first story, the participants were read the following
text: ‘‘Imagine you offered your bike for sale. You want to
sell it for 500 Swiss Francs. A young man is interested. He
bargains with you and you agree on 420 Swiss Francs.
Then he says: ‘Sorry, I don’t have the money on me; I’ll
quickly run home to get it. I’ll be back in half an hour.’
You say: ‘Agreed, I’ll wait for you.’ Shortly after he is
gone, another customer shows up who is willing to pay the
full price.’’ In the second story, the participants were read
the following text: ‘‘Imagine that you have found a purse
with 150 Swiss Francs in it and an identity card of the
owner’’ (Krettenauer and Eichler 2006).
After reading each story, the participants were asked (1)
what they would do (action decision), (2) how they would
feel about doing it (attribution of emotion), and (3) why
they would do it and feel this way about it (justification).
The action decision was coded as moral (i.e., wait for the
first customer, bring the purse to lost and found) or pragmatic
(i.e., take the money, take the purse). The question about the
attribution of emotion was open-ended. Participants were
asked to report the emotions they would attribute to them-
selves, based on the following three categories (created
afterwards): bad/mixed, good, and neutral. For justification, a
revised coding system derived from Nunner-Winkler et al.
(2007) was used. It consisted of two categories: (1) moral/
empathic: reference to moral principles or rules, such as
justice, fairness, or honesty (e.g., ‘‘One should always keep
his or her promise; it is otherwise unfair’’) and (2) pragmatic:
expression of an exclusive interest in personal profit or
avoidance of sanctions (e.g., ‘‘He profits greatly from that’’).
For the 15-year-olds, 129 of the 1,258 interviews (10%)
were coded by two independent coders, yielding an interrater
reliability of j = .97. For the 21-year-olds, 66 of the 584
interviews (11%) were coded by the same two independent
coders, yielding an interrater reliability of j = .91. Dis-
agreements were discussed and common decisions reached.
The scores for action decisions, attribution of emotion,
and justification were combined as follows to create the
final measure of moral motivation (Nunner-Winkler et al.
2006, 2007). First, the stories were coded. A story was
assigned the highest rating (2) if the participant made a
moral (as opposed to a pragmatic) decision and attributed
either positive or negative emotions for moral reasons.
(Less than 1% of the participants decided to act morally
and justified this decision with pragmatic reasons). If the
participant made a pragmatic decision but felt bad about it
for moral/empathic reasons, it was scored as 1. The lowest
rating (0) was assigned when the participant made a
pragmatic decision, felt good or neutral about it, and jus-
tified it with a pragmatic argument. After the coding, the
scores of the two stories were combined.
This scoring procedure follows the conceptualization of
strength of moral motivation as prioritizing moral consid-
erations over nonmoral desires (Nunner-Winkler 1999;
Frankfurt 1993). Strong moral motivation implies the will-
ingness to (almost) always abide by a moral rule that one
understands to be valid, despite the presence of nonmoral
desires. Medium moral motivation is more cost-benefit
oriented (‘‘I do the right thing if it doesn’t cost too much’’).
Weak moral motivation is reflected in the choice to (almost)
always give nonmoral desires priority over moral consid-
erations (Nunner-Winkler, personal communication, May
30, 2008). Thus, the highest combined score (3) was
assigned if in both stories the participant decided to act
morally and justified the decision morally. If a participant
decided one story morally but decided the other story
pragmatically, and felt bad about the latter decision for
moral reasons, the combined score was 2. The combined
score was 1 if (1) the participant made pragmatic decisions
for both stories but felt bad about those decisions for moral
reasons, or (2) the participant judged one story morally and
the other pragmatically, followed with the attribution of
positive emotions and pragmatic justifications, or (3) the
participant decided both stories pragmatically and only one
of these was followed by the attribution of negative emo-
tions and moral justifications. Finally, the combined score
was 0 if the participant judged both stories pragmatically,
felt good or neutral about the judgments, and justified these
attributions with pragmatic arguments. Thus, each partici-
pant was assigned a single strength-of-moral-motivation
score ranging from 0 (low strength) to 3 (high strength).
Perceived Quality of Friendships
Revised versions of four items from Parker and Asher
(1993) were used (e.g., ‘‘My friend and I trust each other’s
advice’’; ‘‘My friend and I tell each other private things’’).
Because of our characterization of good relationships as
involving support and intimacy, we decided to include two
items from the help and guidance subscale and two items
from the intimate exchange subscale.
The higher the score, the better the friendship. The
questions asked only if the participant had a best friend,
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and almost all (99.6% of the 15-year-olds, and 97.4% of the
21-year-olds) reported that they did. The items were rated
on a 6-point scale from never to always. The reliabilities of
the mean scale scores were a = .61 for the 15-year-olds
and a = .75 for the 21-year-olds.
Perceived Quality of the Parent-Child Relationship
The participants answered four revised items from the
German version of the Supportive Parenting Scale (Buch-
mann et al. 2007). For example, ‘‘How often does your
primary caregiver let you feel that he or she deeply trusts
you?’’ The items were answered on a 6-point-scale from
never to always. The reliabilities of the mean scores were
a = .73 for the 15-year-olds and a = .78 for the 21-year-
olds. The primary caregivers of the 15-year-olds responded
to the same four items (a = .65). As the self-ratings and
primary-caregiver ratings were significantly related,
r(1,019) = .33, p \ 001, an aggregate mean score was
created for the 15-year-olds. Higher scores indicate a better
parent–child relationship.
Education
Educational background was defined in terms of partici-
pants’ attained grade level in school. The measure
consisted of two dummy-coded variables, with a 1 indi-
cating the occurrence of the respective education level.
First, a variable that distinguished between high school
tracks that provide for the educational credential providing
eligibility for university entry and those that do not (Mit-
telschule versus rest). Second, a variable that distinguished
between schools from the lower tracks and others (Reals-
chule and lower versus rest). Twenty-four percent of the
15-year-olds and 29% of the 21-year-olds were in the lower
tracks, whereas 12% of the 15-year-olds and 11% of the
21-year-olds were in the high track.
Value of Social Justice
The personal importance of social justice was measured by
revisions of three items taken from previous longitudinal
studies (Buchmann et al. 2007). For example, ‘‘How
important is it for you to treat others fairly and just.’’
Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to10 how
important each value is in their life. For15-year-olds,
a = .58, and for 21-year-olds, a = .56. Higher scores
indicate more importance attached to social justice.
Personality Characteristics
A validated bipolar adjective checklistwas chosen to assess
the Big Five personality dimensions (i.e., agreeableness,
conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and
openness; Buchmann et al. 2007), using three pairs of
contrasting adjectives for each of the five personality
dimensions (e.g., ‘‘agreeable versus irritable’’). The items
were answered on a 6-point scale, higher scores indicating
greater presence of the personality characteristic. Follow-
ing the research design of the COCON study, primary-
caregiver reports were used to assess the personality
characteristics of the 15-year-olds, whereas self-reports
were used to measure the personality characteristics of the
21-year-olds. (Cronbach’s as for the 15- and 21-year-olds
ranged from .58 to .81; Buchmann et al. 2007). Extraver-
sion and openness were not considered further, because
they do not necessarily resemble characteristics related to
resilient ego functioning. Openness was measured with
creativity items.
Cognitive Ability
As a control variable, respondents’ cognitive competences
were assessed using the half subscale 2.4 of Weiß’s (1998)
culture fair intelligence test (CFT-20). Higher scores
indicate higher cognitive competences.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
To test for sex differences in the study variables, ANOVAs
were conducted for each age group (see Table 1, for means
and standard deviations of the study variables by age group
and sex). We tested sex differences separately for each age
cohort, because not all measures were comparable across
age cohorts. Preliminary analyses indicated no age differ-
ences in moral motivation. As Table 1 indicates, females in
both age cohorts reported higher moral motivation, quality
of friendships, and importance of social justice than males.
Regarding personality characteristics, females were less
emotionally stable and more conscientious than males in
both age cohorts. Among the 21-year-olds, females were
less educated than males (females: 23%, males: 35%),
v2(1, 582) = 9.47, p \ .01; there was no significant dif-
ference among the 15-year-olds (females: 23%; males:
26%), v2(1, 1,241) = 1.66.
The correlations between the study variables for the
15-year-olds are summarized in Table 2. In the text, we
report only correlations C.10, because correlations \.10
are considered to represent a small effect size (Valentine
and Cooper 2003).
For the 15-year-olds, the strength of moral motivation is
positively associated with the quality of parent–child
relationships, importance of social justice, and it is greater
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for females. Friendship quality is positively related to the
importance of social justice and is also higher for females
than for males. The quality of the parent–child relationship
is positively related to the importance of social justice,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability.
High education level is positively associated with emo-
tional stability. Low education level was negatively
associated with the importance of social justice. The latter
is positively associated with all personality characteristics
and higher for females. Females scored higher than males
on conscientiousness. All the personality characteristics are
significantly intercorrelated.
The correlations for the 21-year-olds reveal that the
strength of moral motivation is positively associated with
the quality of friendships, importance of social justice, and
agreeableness, and it is negatively related to emotional
stability; males scored higher than females (Table 3).
Friendship quality is positively associated with the quality
of the parent–child relationship, importance of social jus-
tice, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, with females
scoring higher than males. The quality of the parent–child
relationship is positively related to the importance of social
justice, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Low educa-
tional level is positively related to conscientiousness and is
higher for males than for females. The importance of social
justice is positively related to agreeableness and consci-
entiousness, and it is higher for females. Agreeableness is
positively associated with conscientiousness and emotional
stability. Females score higher on conscientiousness and
males score higher on emotional stability.
Prediction of Strength of Moral Motivation
by Socialization and Individual Antecedents
Separate regression analyses were performed for the two
age groups. The moral motivation scores of the 15-year-
olds and of the 21-year-olds, respectively, were entered as
the dependent variables.
The independent variables were entered stepwise (see
Table 4). Sex was entered in the first step; quality of
friendship, quality of the parent–child relationship, and
education level were entered in the second step; the
Table 2 Correlations between study variables for 15-year-olds (N = 1,258)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Strength of moral motivation –
2. Friendship relationship .05 –
3. Parent–child relationship .10** .05 –
4. High education level .01 -.06* .03 –
5. Low education level .01 .03 .02 -.20*** –
6. Importance of social justice .14*** .21*** .10** -.01 -.16*** –
7. Agreeableness .09** -.02 .38*** .03 -.03 .12*** –
8. Conscientiousness .07* .03 .31*** .02 -.04 .14*** .47*** –
9. Emotional stability .02 .01 .22*** .11** -.04 .11** .48*** .40*** –
10. Sex -.11*** -.40*** -.03 -.01 .04 -.18*** -.05 -.20*** .07* –
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
Table 1 Means (Standard Deviations) of study variables by age group and sex
15-year-olds (N = 1,258) 21-year-olds (N = 584)
Female Male Effect size
(d)
Total Female Male Effect size
(d)
Total
Strength of moral
motivation
2.26*** (0.82) 2.07 (0.92) 0.21 2.17 (0.88) 2.32*** (0.78) 2.06 (0.89) 0.32 2.19 (0.84)
Friendship relationship 5.68*** (0.49) 5.15 (0.71) 0.87 5.42 (0.66) 5.76*** (0.45) 5.53 (0.65) 0.41 5.64 (0.57)
Parent–child relationship 5.21 (0.64) 5.17 (0.56) 0.07 5.19 (0.60) 5.08 (0.90) 5.00 (0.82) 0.09 4.43 (0.70)
Importance of social justice 8.84*** (1.21) 8.41 (1.20) 0.35 8.64 (1.22) 8.94*** (1.12) 8.61 (1.25) 0.27 8.78 (1.20)
Agreeableness 4.50 (0.87) 4.40 (1.10) 0.10 4.45 (0.99) 4.67 (0.82) 4.65 (0.73) 0.02 4.65 (0.78)
Conscientiousness 4.51*** (1.04) 4.03 (1.29) 0.41 4.29 (1.19) 4.58** (0.86) 4.36 (0.99) 0.24 4.47 (0.93)
Emotional stability 4.16* (0.85) 4.30 (1.08) 0.14 4.23 (0.97) 3.72*** (0.89) 4.56 (0.72) 1.04 4.14 (0.91)
Note: The significance notations are for t tests comparing females and males for the two age cohorts
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
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importance of social justice and the personality dimensions
were entered in the third step. Several control variables
were also added to the regression models: an index code for
interview quality as rated by the interviewers was entered
in the first step; structural variables indicating the socio-
economic milieu and migration background of participants
were entered in the second step; cognitive ability was
entered in the third step.
Preliminary analyzes indicate no significant moderating
effects of sex and these analyzes were not considered in the
final set of analyzes.
Both models yield medium effect sizes, Cohen’s
f2 = .11. Among the 15-year-olds, moral motivation is
positively related to the quality of the parent–child rela-
tionship and importance of social justice. It is higher for
females than for males. Among the 21-year-olds, moral
motivation is positively associated with the quality of
friendships, importance of social justice, and agreeable-
ness. It is also higher for females than for males.
Discussion
The present study is the first to investigate the role of
socialization and individual antecedents of moral motiva-
tion in representative samples of two age cohorts
representing prototypical life stages: mid-adolescence and
young adulthood. The study is novel in its scope but also
exploratory, so the results need to be followed up. None-
theless, the study provides useful information on the under-
researched topic of moral psychology, i.e., the strength of
moral motivation.
Table 3 Correlations between study variables for 21-year-olds (N = 584)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Strength of moral motivation –
2. Friendship relationship .16*** –
3. Parent–child relationship .03 .10* –
4. High education level .01 -.06 .04 –
5. Low education level -.03 .00 .01 -.22*** –
6. Importance of social justice .19*** .25*** .15*** -.06 -.07 –
7. Agreeableness .13** .11** .16*** .05 .03 .30*** –
8. Conscientiousness -.01 .11* .11** -.03 .10* .10* .11* –
9. Emotional stability -.11** -.03 .07 .02 .02 -.06 .12** .06 –
10. Sex -.16*** -.20*** -.05 -.06 .13** -.14** -.00 -.12** .46*** –
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
Table 4 Results of the
hierarchical linear regression
analysis predicting the strength
of moral motivation of 15-year-
olds and 21-year-olds
Note: Models are controlled for
interview quality, indicators of
socio-economic milieu of
participants, and cognitive
ability
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, ***
p \ .001
Strength of moral motivation
15-year-olds (N = 1,258) 21-year-olds (N = 584)
Independent variables b R2/D F for step/f2 b R2/D F for step/f2
Step 1 .02/7.59**/.02 .02/5.95**/.02
Sex -.14*** -.15**
Step 2: socialization antecedents .07/2.76***/.08 .07/1.84*/.08
Friendship relationship -.02 .10*
Parent–child relationship .11** -.02
High education level -.01 .03
Low education level -.05 -.04
Step 3: individual antecedents .10/3.54**/.11 .10/2.84*/.11
Importance of social justice .14*** .12*
Agreeableness .03 .10*
Conscientiousness -.02 .03
Emotional stability -.07 -.05
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First, we analyzed moral motivation (i.e., quality of
relationships with friends and caregivers, educational
attainment) as a function of socialization. An important
finding was a positive relationship between the perceived
quality of close friendships and moral motivation among
the 21-year-olds. It was surprising that this relation was
limited to the older age cohort, as close friendships are
considered to be the basis of adolescent morality (Bu-
kowski and Sippola 1996; Keller 1996). The finding also
seems to contradict previous research on the impact of
constructive and supportive friendship interactions on
adolescents’ moral reasoning (e.g., Walker et al. 2000). As
we focused on the perceived quality of close friendships
rather than observed quality of mutual interactions between
friends, the different findings from the two studies may
relate to these measurement differences. Presumably, our
measure of perceived quality of friendship relation is more
indicative for an individual orientation towards support and
care in close friendship relationships than of experiences of
mutually reciprocal emotional support. Nonetheless, our
data indicate that the quality of the relationship with the
primary caregiver is more important to adolescent’s moral
motivation than is the perceived quality of the friendship.
This finding is interesting, as the parent–child relationship
has been shown to become more conflict-laden during early
to mid-adolescence, albeit only temporarily (Laursen et al.
1998). However, the adolescents in our sample did not
perceive the relationship to their primary caregiver to be
any poorer than did the young adults. Thus, both groups
perceived their relationship with the caregiver to be close
and positive. This may in turn create a positive atmosphere
for moral growth (Van Ijzendoorn 1997). The perceived
quality of the relationship to the caregiver did not affect the
moral motivation of the young adults. Although this finding
indirectly contradicts some related longitudinal research on
the impact of early supportive parenting on young adults’
care reasoning (e.g., Pratt et al. 2004), it is in line with the
findings of Nunner-Winkler (2007), who failed to find any
impact of early childhood family socialization on moral
motivation in young adulthood. We think this finding
makes sense, because young adults often have already
resolved their conflicts surrounding autonomy and inter-
dependence, and thus they do not usually depend as much
on the quality of their relationship to the primary caregiver
as adolescents might. Identity and related moral develop-
ment are presumably related more strongly to the quality of
interactions with close friends.
Contrary to our expectations, there were no relations
between education level and moral motivation. These
findings contradict those of Nunner-Winkler et al. (2006),
who found that 16-year-olds from the highest educational
track displayed higher moral motivation than 16-year-olds
adolescents from the lowest educational track. The
difference in results is possibly due to our use of repre-
sentative data samples, whereas Nunner-Winkler et al.
(2006) only compared students in the lowest and highest
education tracks. Nunner-Winkler (2007) also found no
relationships between social class and strength of moral
motivation in a longitudinal sample of German children.
Perhaps educational levels have a greater impact on the
cognitive components of morality (i.e., the ability to make
moral judgments) than on moral motivation.
The importance attached to social justice predicted
moral motivation in both age cohorts. This finding vali-
dates those of Nunner-Winkler et al. (2006), who showed
that adolescents highly value both moral motivation and
social justice and that these high valuations carry over into
young adulthood. The two studies together provide
empirical support for the argument that the strength of
motivation to act upon rules is associated with the extent to
which one values justice, incorporates this value into one’s
identity, and draws on it as a basis for moral behavior
(Blasi 2004; Knafo et al. 2008).
Further, we examined the role of personality character-
istics in moral motivation. Personality characteristics were
defined as representing a complex system of self-organi-
zation and of social-cognitive and socio-emotional
functioning that is continuously (re)constructed during
development (Noam 1992). Young adults’ strength of
moral motivation was found to be positively related to
agreeableness and negatively related to emotional stability.
The multivariate findings for the 21-year-olds suggest that
only agreeableness is related positively to moral motivation
in this age cohort. There is empirical evidence that moral
exemplars reflect characteristics such as agreeableness and
conscientiousness (Matsuba and Walker 2004; Walker
2004). Our finding of a relationship between agreeableness
and moral motivation in the 21-year-olds is in line with this
research in the U.S. and thus cross-culturally validates the
hypothesis that agreeableness is important for moral
motivation. This finding is reasonable, as high agreeable-
ness reflects an orientation toward others’ welfare, and it is
presumably the personality characteristic that most closely
resembles a moral orientation. Personality characteristics
such as agreeableness are potentially more important for
the moral motivation of young adults than for that of
adolescents, because young adulthood is a time when
morality is assumed to be more fully integrated into per-
sonhood (Blasi 2004). However, the findings from the two
regression models in the present study cannot be directly
compared, because different informants were used to rate
the personality characteristics of the two age groups.
It is noteworthy that we found no age differences in
moral motivation. We expected moral motivation to be
higher in young adults than in adolescents, because identity
and moral development tend to become increasingly well
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coordinated during this period. As ours is the first study to
explore developmental differences in moral motivation, we
can only speculate about possible reasons for this lack of
age differences. On the one hand, research on adult moral
exemplars supports the high stability of moral motivation
over time (e.g., Colby and Damon 1992). Morality may
constitute the very personhood of these exemplars (Nun-
ner-Winkler et al. 2007). Individual differences in the
strength of moral motivation may be related to how people
integrate moral motivation into their identity rather than to
chronological age. It will therefore be instructive to follow
up our adolescents longitudinally and investigate the intra-
individual development of moral motivation. The oldest
participants in our study were 21 years of age, and it might
well be that moral motivation does not begin growing until
later, when young people have developed a strong sense of
identity and moved to a more emotionally mature adult-
hood, which doesn’t manifest until the early 30 s in many
Western countries (Arnett 2000). On the other hand, these
older adults may not only integrate moral motivation into
their identity at an accelerated pace; they may also
increasingly differentiate their understanding of when it is
important to act morally and when not. Future longitudinal
studies using vignettes depicting a wide range of situations
may shed light on the validity of this speculation.
Interestingly, females scored higher on moral motiva-
tion than males in our study. Although this finding needs to
be interpreted very cautiously, as we used only two vign-
ettes, it is in line with the findings of Nunner-Winkler et al.
(2007) and extends them to young adulthood. The latter
study used vignettes that are structurally similar to ours
(although there were more of them). Our findings are thus
not simply measurement artefacts, a conclusion that is also
supported by findings of sex differences in moral motiva-
tion in a representative longitudinal sample of children
(Malti et al. 2009). Nunner-Winkler et al. (2006, 2007)
interpreted their sex differences in terms of how people
anchor morality in their personality. For example, females
with a high sex-role orientation may not experience a
decrease in moral motivation, because female role expec-
tations (e.g., nurturance) are compatible with morality. In
contrast, males who identify with typical male attributes,
such as success and power, may be less concerned with
morality and social justice than other males. More recently,
Turiel (2002) has proposed a somewhat different expla-
nation, namely, that differences in morality may be related
to differences in men’s and women’s standing in the social
hierarchy. People with low power and low status in the
social hierarchy may be morally sensitized to issues of
unfairness and inequality. In general, women’s legal status
is equivalent to that of men in Switzerland. Nonetheless,
their occupational opportunities still lag behind those of
men (Buchmann and Kriesi 2009). This occupational
segregation by sex is responsible, for example, for
women’s lower pay, lower occupational status, and lower
social status. Sex differences in moral motivation may be
associated with these inequities in Swiss society. Further
research on how societal inequality affects women’s and
men’s moral motivation is needed.
Finally, several limitations of our study should be noted.
First, only two vignettes were used to assess the strength of
moral motivation. As social domain researchers have
shown that moral development depends on context (e.g.,
Smetana 2006), the reliability of this methodological
approach is restricted. However, Nunner-Winkler et al.
(2007) obtained overall rather similar results to ours using
a wider range of vignettes to measure the strength of moral
motivation. Given the large-scale character of our study,
we also had to restrict the qualitative measures of morality
to a realistic number in terms of later coding, and the two
vignettes were carefully chosen and tested in a pilot study.
The two vignettes we did use were carefully chosen and
tested in a pilot study. Further, previous studies have pro-
vided evidence for the reliability of using only two
vignettes to assess moral motivation (e.g., Malti et al.
2009). Second, our analyses indicated only low to moder-
ate reliability in some of our test measures. These measures
were predominantly self-reports, which are susceptible to
social desirability response bias. Further validation of our
results in multi-informant studies is therefore warranted.
Third, we used different informants to rate the personality
characteristics of the two age groups. We were thus not
able to draw conclusions about age differences in the
relationship between personality characteristics and moral
motivation. Fourth, the effect sizes from the multivariate
models predicting strength of moral motivation were only
moderate. This finding suggests that variables not
accounted for in the present analyses are likely to be
important for the development of moral motivation. Fifth,
as our study incorporated only a cross-sectional design, it
must be considered exploratory. The causes of the relation
between moral motivation and the quality of family and
friendship relationships remain unclear. Future studies
employing longitudinal designs would be particularly
helpful in further disentangling the impact of socialization
and individual differences on the development of moral
motivation.
In conclusion, the study at hand makes a significant con-
tribution to our understanding of the development of moral
motivation, because it is the first that analyzed moral moti-
vation in two different life-decades with comparable
measures: mid-adolescence and young adulthood. It also
methodologically extended the few previous studies on
adolescents’ moral motivation by utilizing large, represen-
tative Swiss samples. This sampling procedure provided the
opportunity to assess moral motivation and its precursors
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across different (sub)populations and might therefore help to
validate previous findings that used the more common North
American middle-class samples. Furthermore, our findings
provided the first empirical evidence for the importance of
supportive relationships and individual differences in the
development of moral motivation. In regard to the relation-
ship between supportive relationships and moral motivation,
our findings indicated that the quality of the parent–child
relationship is important for adolescents’ moral motivation,
whereas the quality of the friendship relationship has a sig-
nificant impact on young adults’ moral motivation. In regard
to individual antecedents of moral motivation, our findings
showed that the importance of social justice is positively
related to moral motivation in both age cohorts. By docu-
menting developmental differences and similarities in the
relationship between moral motivation, supportive rela-
tionships, and individual factors, the study makes a major
contribution to our understanding of the specific develop-
mental precursors of moral motivation and the related
evolving moral self. Further research that sheds light on the
complex processes involved in the development and
socialization of moral motivation awaits.
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